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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are listed in the
caption.
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•
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement of jurisdiction.
V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Bone submits that the issues and applicable standards of
appellate review are as follows:
1.

Whether a plaintiff who fails to prove any threshold

requirement under Utah no-fault law may recover a general damage
verdict.
2.

Whether the district court erred in striking

Plaintiff's general damage award when the jury found Plaintiff
failed to satisfy the $3,000 medical expense threshold required
to maintain an action for general damages under Utah's no-fault
law, U.C.A. § 31A-22-309.
3.

Whether there was evidence upon which the jury could

find that the Plaintiff incurred less than $3,000 in medical
expenses related to the accident.
4.

Whether plaintiff has waived any claim of jury

prejudice by failing to request jurors to be excused for cause or
failure to exercise preemptory challenges, where the alleged
prejudice was known by counsel prior to empanelment of the jury.
5.

Whether plaintiff's failure to request or object to the

court's failure to include instructions or special verdict forms
-1-

addressing permanent disability constitutes waiver of error on
appeal.
6.

Whether the failure to give instructions on permanent

disability is harmless error in light of the evidence that
plaintiff suffered no objective impairment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of denial of motion for new trial is
for abuse of discretion.

Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1315

(Utah 1988).
With respect to issues 1 and 2, questions of law are to be
reviewed for correctness.

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757,

759 (Utah 1990) .
With respect to issue 3, "To successfully attack the
verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence supporting
the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support it."

Hind v. Ouilles, 745 P.2d 1239

(Utah 1987).
Review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to
support a verdict will be reversed only if, in reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it concludes
the evidence is insufficient to support the award.
Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987).
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).

-2-

Cambelt Int'l
Hansen v.

With respect to issue 4, where the party knows of potential
juror prejudice or bias, challenge must be asserted before the
jury is sworn, otherwise the error is waived.

Burton v.

Z.C.M.I., 249 P.2d 514 (Utah 1952).
With respect to issues 5 and 6, Appellate Courts will not
review the failure to object to instructions or objection to
failure to give instructions or special verdicts, except in
special circumstances.

The burden of showing special

circumstances exist is on the party claim error.

U.R.C.P. 51;

E.A. Strout W. Realty Aaencv v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1983); Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah
1987).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61
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VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case arises out of an automobile accident involving
Plaintiff Chanhmany, and Defendants Bone and Preston.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The case was tried by jury April 27-29, 1993. At the
conclusion of the case, the jury returned a verdict finding Brian
Bone 100 percent negligent.

The jury found Plaintiff incurred

$2,100 in medical expenses.

The jury further awarded general

damages in the amount of $3,000. R. 342-343.
Plaintiff did not request instructions regarding threshold
requirements under Utah no-fault law or request instructions or
special verdicts regarding whether Plaintiff was permanently
disabled as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff's own proposed

jury instructions merely listed disability as an element of
general damages.

R. 106, 111.

The Defendant brought a motion to strike the $3,000 general
damage award based on Plaintiff's failure to meet the no-fault
threshold for medical expenses.

The court granted Defendant's

motion and struck the general damage award.

R. 392-394; R. 391.

Plaintiff filed an exception and motion for new trial which
was denied.

R. 425. This appeal followed.

-4-

C.

Statement of the Facts

Appellees accept Plaintiff's facts regarding the
circumstances and cause of the accident.
At voir

dire

of the jury, Plaintiff's counsel was aware of

the expressed reservations of two jurors regarding the propriety
of treatment by chiropractors.

Despite the reservations,

Plaintiff's counsel passed the jury for cause without objection
to Mr. Nordstrom or Mr. Staheli in chambers, TR. 45, or in open
court TR. 46. Further, Plaintiff's counsel did not exercise any
preemptory challenges to excuse the now allegedly prejudiced or
biased jurors. TR 46-47.
In her case in chief, Plaintiff alleged $3,299.09 in medical
expenses were related to the accident.

TR. 278-79, Exhibit 3.

Plaintiff admitted, however, that she did not seek treatment
for nearly a one-year period, from September 13, 1989 to November
of 1990.

See TR. 372; Exhibit P-3; TR. 135. Plaintiff's return

for treatment also coincided with her second pregnancy, TR. 159,
which her doctor admitted could have been the sole cause of her
back pain.

TR. 160-161. Plaintiff also admitted that after the

birth of her child she did not do any of the exercises prescribed
by her doctors.

TR. 80.

Plaintiff did not offer any evidence that she suffered a
permanent disability.

Instead, Plaintiff elicited evidence that

she had received a permanent impairment rating from both
Plaintiff's and Defendants' doctors ranging from 6.8 percent to
-5-

12 percent.

There was evidence offered that an impairment did

not mean that Plaintiff was disabled.

TR. 221-222. There was

also evidence that Plaintiff's impairment rating had no objective
basis whatsoever.

TR. 217.

The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding
permanent disability because no evidence of permanent disability
was before the court. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to request any
instruction on permanent disability or object to the court's
failure to include instructions on permanent disability to the
jury.

Further, Plaintiff did not offer any special verdict

requiring the jury to determine whether Plaintiff was permanently
disabled as a result of the accident.

Instead, the Plaintiff

argued disability was part of Plaintiff's general damages.
The jury found Bone 100 percent negligent and awarded
Plaintiff $2,100 in medical expenses and $3,000 in general
damages.

The court, on motion, struck the general damages and

denied Plaintiff's motion for additur or a new trial finding that
Plaintiff had failed to satisfy the threshold required by Utah
no-fault law.

TR. 428-429.
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Where a plaintiff fails to prove at trial that no-fault
thresholds have been met, she may not maintain an action for
general damages and may not recover any verdict for general
damages in her favor.
-6-

The plain language of the statute and the specific intent of
no-fault law mandate a jury award for general damages be stricken
where Plaintiff fails to establish no-fault thresholds have been
met.

Moreover, it is Plaintiff's burden to plead and prove all

the elements of her case; including threshold elements.
There was ample evidence upon which the jury could base its
decision that Plaintiff incurred only $2,100 in medical expenses
related to the accident.

Plaintiff also failed to meet the no-

fault threshold by failing to plead and prove she sustained a
permanent disability as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff did

not prosecute her claim based on permanent disability, but,
instead, she claimed impairment as a measure of general damages.
Plaintiff's failure to request instructions or a special
verdict regarding permanent disability constitutes waiver of any
claim of error by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was not denied her right to jury trial based on
Plaintiff's own failure to offer instructions or object to their
absence.

Alternatively, the jury's award reflects that there was

no finding of permanent disability and because there was evidence
that the Plaintiff's impairment was entirely subjective, the
threshold was still unmet, as a matter of law.

-7

IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THE NO-FAULT THRESHOLD BY
FAILING TO PROVE $3.000 IN MEDICAL EXPENSES RELATED TO
THE ACCIDENT.
1.

WHERE A PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD AND PROVE
THRESHOLD MEDICAL EXPENSES, SHE CANNOT MAINTAIN AN
ACTION FOR GENERAL DAMAGES UNDER UTAH LAW.

In this case Plaintiff brought over $3,000 in medical bills
to the courtroom alleging they were caused by the accident.
Exhibit P-3.

See,

Upon examination and presentation of the

Plaintiff's case, the jury found that only $2,100 in medical
expenses were related to this accident.

R. 343. As a result the

trial court struck the general damages award of $3,000. R. 392394.
The issue is whether a plaintiff may recover a verdict for
general damages when the jury finds that the plaintiff failed to
incur medical expenses in excess of $3,000 related to the
accident, thus failing to meet the no-fault threshold set forth
in U.C.A. § 31A-2-309.
Under Utah no-fault law, a plaintiff must incur more than
$3,000 in medical expenses related to the accident or she may not
"maintain" an action for general damages.

U.C.A. §31A-22-309(l).

Plaintiff asserts that once this threshold is met, the action for
general damages may be maintained regardless of the jury's
evidential verdict on the threshold issue.
-8-

Plaintiff's assertion on appeal fails for numerous reasons.
First, the plain language and purposes of the no-fault statute
are contrary to Plaintiff's position.

Second, the burden is on

Plaintiff to plead and prove the threshold has been met at all
times through trial.

Third, the exclusive role of the jury to

determine factual issues would be subverted if they were bound by
the threshold determination, which is largely based on
Plaintiff's pleadings rather than actual proof.
a.

Plain Statutory Construction and Legislative
Purpose Require Plaintiff Prove Threshold
Requirements Have Been Met,

Under Utah law, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves a
threshold condition, she is unable to "maintain" her action for
general damages.

U.C.A. § 31A-22-309; See, Allstate v. I vie, 606

P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980).

It is important to note that the

word "maintain" was chosen by the drafters over the other obvious
possibility, "bring."

It is very different to say a person must

satisfy a condition in order to "bring" an action, as opposed to
the fulfilling of the condition in order to "maintain" one.

See

Jepson v. State Dept. Corrections. 846 P.2d 485, 487 (Utah App.
1993) (no-fault threshold may be met any time up to trial, making
statute of limitations accrue at date of accident).

By its plain

language the Plaintiff must prove the alleged threshold medical
expenses were caused by the accident or be unable to maintain the
action for general damages, whenever that factual determination
is made.
-9-

b.

The Statutory Purpose Would Be Defeated If
Plaintiff Could Recover General Damages Without
Proving Threshold Requirements.

The purpose of no-fault law was to replace the common law
with tort immunity for persons complying with its provisions
until specific thresholds are met.

Allstate, at 1200; Pinell v.

McCrarv, 849 P.2d 848 (Colo. App. 1992) cert, denied (1993).

To

permit a party who fails to prove a threshold issue to recover
general damages, would subject an otherwise immune person to
liability for general damages.

This result would defeat the

express purposes of the no-fault scheme.

See Allstate, at 1200.

Consistent application of the no-fault immunity requires the
Plaintiff prove threshold issues before general damages may be
recovered, whether that be at the pretrial, trial or verdict
stage.
In Grand v. Durst. 482 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1984), it was
held that the trial court properly ruled the plaintiff could not
recover the $7,000 verdict in his favor because the plaintiff had
failed to prove any no-fault threshold was satisfied although it
had been alleged in the complaint.

The Court in Grand, noted,

"it is clear that because appellant failed to meet the threshold
requirements, he cannot be awarded a verdict in his favor."

Id.

at 1009, n. 3.
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff's failure to prove the
threshold issue precludes recovery of a general damages award.

-10-

The trial court was correct in striking the general damage award
in this case.
c.

It is Plaintiffs burden to plead and prove the
threshold issue to the jury.

In Pinell, the court stated the "statutory threshold is an
essential condition of a plaintiff's right to recover damages in
a negligence action, and the plaintiff therefore has the burden
of pleading and proving facts which establish that one of the
threshold criteria has been met."

Pinell, at 850. The Court in

Pinell. went on stating, "In order to satisfy this burden, a
plaintiff must establish not only that he or she actually
sustained an injury within the class of injuries specified by
statute or incurred expenditures of $2,500, but also that the
claimed injury or expenditures were caused by the accident at
issue."

Id. at 850. The court clarified that even if "the

plaintiff incurred medical expenses which have been paid by his
insurance carrier pursuant to (the no-fault statute) does not in
and of itself answer the question of whether the medical expenses
were caused by the accident." Id. at 851.
In Cole v. Berkowitz, 373 N.Y.S. 2d 782, 783 (1975), a case
nearly on point with the present case, the plaintiff alleged the
threshold was met because he sustained $672 in medical expenses.
The jury found, however, that the plaintiff had incurred only
$472 in medical expenses related to the accident and awarded
total damages of $1,500. The no-fault threshold was $500 at that
-11-

time in New York.

The court of appeals ruled that the jury's

determination was dispositive of the threshold issue and
determined that the "jury's special verdict creates a complete
bar to the recovery of non-economic loss (i.e., pain and
suffering) which was the gravamen of plaintiff's damages on the
trial."

Id^ at 783; see also Grand, at 1009, n.3.

Therefore, pursuant to the above authority, it was
Plaintiff's burden to plead and prove that her medical expenses
exceeded the threshold amount.

Plaintiff's failure to convince

the jury that the threshold damages were incurred is fatal to her
ability to maintain a claim for general damages under Utah nofault law.
d.

The Determination Of Medical Expenses Related To
The Accident Is Exclusively The Role Of The Jury.

According to the Court in Pinell, "whether a plaintiff has
met the statutory threshold is usually a question of fact." Id.
at 850. The jury's determination of threshold issues must be
permitted as a part of its fact finding role.

To rule otherwise

would be removing an essential element of the jury function to
which Plaintiff fiercely claims a right in her brief on appeal.
Consistency dictates that the jury be the conclusive arbitrar of
the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff's alleged medical
expenses were incurred as a result of the accident.

-12-

2.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND
LESS THAN THRESHOLD MEDICAL EXPENSES.

On appeal. Plaintiff bears the heavy burden of showing the
verdict was not supportable by the evidence.

Cambelt, at 1242.

At trial. Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the medical
expenses were reasonable and necessary.
need to prove unreasonableness.

The defendant does not

Joraensen v. Heinz. 847 P.2d 181

(Colo. App. 1992) cert, denied (1993).

In that light Plaintiff

has erroneously complained that there was no testimony contesting
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's medical bills# and therefore,
they were sufficient as a matter of law.

Moreover/ Plaintiff

admits in her brief that there was a dispute over whether all her
medical expenses were related to the accident.

See Brief of

Appellant/ p. 8.
While the testifying doctors did not specifically attack the
reasonableness of each of the Plaintiff's treatments/ the jury is
not bound by the of the doctors' failure to address the issue.
In making its determination/ the jury will be permitted to rule
on issues of credibility and reasonableness.

In Pinell, the

court also held that the jury was free to believe or disregard
the opinions of the medical experts as they were, "not
necessarily conclusive on the jury/" especially where the
experts' opinions were founded/ in part/ on the subjective
complaints of the witness.

Id. at 852.

-13-

By both evidence and argument, Defendants strenuously
contested the relation of the medical expenses to the accident.
The following examples from the record clearly show evidence was
presented showing the alleged expenses were unrelated to the
accident at issue.

These facts were sufficient for a jury to

base its decision that the medical expenses claimed were not all
related to the accident.
The evidence showed that Plaintiff had a one-year hiatus
from any therapy or treatment by Dr. Whitley from November 1989
to November of 1990. TR. 135. Not only did Plaintiff fail to
seek medical care during that time, she repeatedly canceled
appointments.

TR. 804; Exhibit 3.

Further, her return to the chiropractor for treatment
coincided with her second pregnancy.

She returned to the

chiropractor in November of 1990 in her twenty-third week of
pregnancy complaining of low back pain. TR. 159. Plaintiffs own
doctor testified that the effects of pregnancy alone could cause
the type of pain she experienced in her back.

TR. 160-161.

She also testified after her baby was born she did not
continue with exercises prescribed by treating doctors. TR. 88.
She was seen by her chiropractor an additional fifteen times
after returning to her chiropractor in November of 1990. TR.
804; Exhibit 3.
The jury was free to assimilate this evidence along with the
bills submitted by Plaintiff's doctors and determine that some or
-14-

all of the treatments incurred were not related to the accident,
but associated with other factors such as her pregnancy.

Further

the jury was free to determine that Plaintiff had not mitigated
her damages by failing to perform prescribed exercises as
directed by her doctors, thereby making some or all of the
medical bills unnecessary or unreasonable.
It is obvious that there was ample evidence presented upon
which a jury could rely to find that Plaintiff's medical bills
were, at least in part, unrelated to the accident at issue in
this case.

It is strictly within the providence of the jury to

make such determinations based on the weight of the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses. Plaintiff cannot be heard to
complain that the jury found that she did not incur over $3,000
in medical expenses when there was evidence upon which they jury
could have based its decision.

The trial court in this case was

entirely correct in determining that the threshold had not been
met and that the suit could not be maintained for general damages
as a result.
B.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OR EVEN
QUESTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS ON DISABILITY TO THE
JURY, WAIVING ANY CLAIM OF ERROR OR THAT JURY
TRIAL WAS DENIED, AND FAILING TO MEET THE
THRESHOLD UNDER UTAH LAW.

It is a matter of record that Plaintiff did not specifically
address the issue or even prosecute her claim as one of permanent
disability to satisfy the no-fault threshold.

Rather, there was

only testimony of Plaintiff's impairment. As stated above, it is
-15-

the Plaintiff's duty to plead and prove that a no-fault threshold
has been met.

Pinell, at 850.

In this case Plaintiff assigns

error to the Court's failure to acknowledge that plaintiff was
permanently disabled because she received an impairment rating
and failure to instruct the jury accordingly.
As will be shown, the Plaintiff failed to present any
evidence or offer any instruction regarding permanent disability
or object to the court's exclusion of such instructions, thereby
waiving any claim of error on appeal.

See U.R.C.P. 49, 51.

Further, even if the issue of disability should have been
addressed by the jury, there was no evidence of permanent
disability presented by the Plaintiff below.

Finally, even if an

impairment rating can be considered a finding of permanent
disability, any error was harmless because there was evidence
that the impairment was subjective, rather than objective in
nature.
1.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD OR PROVE PERMANENT
DISABILITY, MAKING HER CLAIM OF DENIAL OF JURY TRIAL ON
THE ISSUE IS MERITLESS.

Throughout the trial, Plaintiff confused the term impairment
with the term disability. See, e.g., TR. 111. Prior to trial
Defendant brought a Motion in Limine addressing the fact that
impairment ratings were not the equivalent of a disability rating
for purposes of claiming damages in tort cases.

R. 254; see

e.g.. Northwest Carriers v. Industrial Comm.. 639 P.2d 138, 140
n.3. (Utah 1981).
-16-

In order to determine whether a person is disabled, an
impairment rating alone is insufficient.

According to the AMA

guidelines:
"Medical Impairment" and "Disability" Are Not
Interchangeable: Medical impairment is an alteration of the
individual's health status assessed by medical means*
Disability
is an alteration of an individual's capacity to
meet personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet
statutory or regulatory requirements.
Babitsky, Understanding The AMA Guides In Worker's Compensation,
p.36 (1992) (citing AMA Guides (3d ed. 1988 at 8)); See accord
Northwest Carriers v. Ind. Comm'n, 639 P.2d 138, 140-141 (Utah
1981).

Utah recognizes this distinction.

See Northwest

Carriers. supra.
In this case, no evidence was ever introduced which
attempted to correlate the medical findings of impairment with an
assessment in their impact on Plaintiff's lifestyle, earning
capacity or job functions (disability). As Dr. Moress testified
simply finding that a person is medically impaired may not
indicate any associated disability:
Okay. Then you're talking about this ability, disability,
which is like judicial or a — it's not a medical —
disability is not a medical term. That's for lawyers and
judges and administrative law judges to determine, any
people who get people back to work, to determine whether or
not you can function with it, with a disability.
* * *

A neurosurgeon who loses the right thumb may be 25 percent
impaired but would be a hundred percent disabled in terms of
his or her profession.
* * *
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When it comes to Mrs. Chanhmany and her problem, it would
depend on the type of work she did. She would really
actually determine that — specifically she would need to
have a functional capacity evaluation which you — which I
don't know. None has been done on her."
TR. 221-222.
Here there was no evidence presented that Plaintiff suffered
from a permanent inability to perform any occupational functions,
incurred loss of earning potential, or other permanent
disability.

Contrary to Plaintiff's inference of ADA

accommodation, Plaintiff did not testify that she was reassigned
to a different job because of her injury.

See TR. 90-91.

Moreover, there was no evidence offered from a vocational
rehabilitation standpoint that Plaintiff was disabled and
precluded from any field or type of employment previously
available to her.

Witnesses from Plaintiff's employment

testified she only required assistance at work for a few weeks.
TR. 260.

The fact she was reassigned, absent additional

evidence, does not permit the conclusion that she was unable to
work or was disabled.
There was also evidence presented to the jury that Plaintiff
was not limited in any objective manner from performing all of
the activities of daily living.

Dr. Moress testified that he

could find no objective basis for her rated impairment.

TR. 217.

The jury was justified in believing the testimony of Dr. Moress
over that of Dr. Whitely.

-18-

The court in Cole, supra, found that the only other possible
basis for claiming the threshold had been met in that case
(permanent disability) had been properly removed from the jury by
the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of permanent
disability.

See, Cole, at 783.

In this case, Plaintiff failed to show any evidence of
permanent disability as opposed to evidence of impairment,
thereby failing to plead and prove the threshold element of
permanent disability as a matter of law.

The court was entirely

correct in not submitting the issue to the jury in light of
Plaintiff's failure to bring any evidence of permanent
disability.

The jury's decision in light most consistent with

the verdict, also indicates that there was no finding of
permanent injury and that there was evidence that no permanent
injury was sustained.
2.

FAILURE TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS OR SPECIAL VERDICTS
REGARDING PERMANENT DISABILITY RESULTS IN WAIVER.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to offer
specific objections to instructions given or the Court's or
failure to give them will constitute waiver of error on appeal.
U.R.C.P. 49, 51; Cambelt Int'l. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1987); Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods, Inc.. 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
The Plaintiff knew that the issue of whether permanent
disability could be established by merely alleging impairment was
-19-

contested prior to trial by motion and Plaintiff knew that it
would be contested at trial.

See Motion in Limine, R. 254-259.

However, Plaintiff failed to request any instructions or object
to the trial court's failure to include instructions or special
verdicts regarding a finding of permanent disability by the jury.
Instead, Plaintiff chose to posture her case exclusively on the
medical expense threshold and use the impairment rating as an
indicator of Plaintiff's general damages.

Plaintiff's own

proposed jury instructions merely use disability and impairment
as a measure of general damages. R. 106, 111. Plaintiff's
disingenuous claim that the court "concluded" Plaintiff was
disabled misrepresents the context of the judge's statement,
which was made outside of the presence of the jury on a
tangential issue.

TR. 268-271.

Plaintiff's claim that she was denied a jury trial on the
issue omits the obvious fact that she was the architect of her
case and failed to bring the issue to the court for resolution.
No error can be found with the Court for Plaintiff's own lack of
prosecution of the issue.
Plaintiff's failure to understand the difference between
impairment and disability while prosecuting the case should not
work to Defendants' detriment.
two bites at the apple.

To find otherwise gives Plaintiff

Plaintiff wittingly chose not to seek of

obtain expert opinion on permanent disability, instead she chose
to rely on the impairment rating (and disability) as an element
-20-

of her general damages and relied solely on the medical expenses
to meet the no-fault threshold.

She cannot be allowed to alter

her basis for recovery after trial when the claim was available
to her initially and not pursued.
3.

CLAIMS OF DISABILITY FAIL BASED ON HARMLESS ERROR.

Even if Plaintiff's case actually presented evidence of
permanent disability sufficient to meet the threshold and the
issue should have been submitted to the jury, there was
admissible, credible evidence showing that Plaintiff had suffered
no objectively ascertainable impairment.

On appeal Plaintiff

points to the recently passed amendment to U.C.A. § 31A-22-309,
in an effort to show that an impairment rating is equivalent to a
finding of permanent disability, permitting her to maintain an
action.

However, Plaintiff glosses over the fact that even the

new statute requires that the impairment rating be based on
"objective findings".

Id.

In this case there was specific testimonial evidence
presented by Dr. Moress that the Plaintiff's impairment rating
was based solely on her subjective complaints and not on any
medically objective findings.

TR. pp. 216-217; 220-221.

Therefore, even assuming that the issue should have gone to the
jury on the basis of an impairment rating alone, the threshold
still had not been met because the jury could have believed the
testimony of Dr. Moress that the impairment rating Plaintiff
received was based only on subjective factors.
-21-

Further, the fact that the jury found only $3,000 in general
damages, and specifically found that amount was to include the
one week vacation she missed as a result of the accident,
indicates that there was no belief that she was permanently
disabled, especially in light of Plaintiff's attorney's request
for over $50,000 in general damages.

TR. 343. Therefore, any

claim of error is harmless and is not grounds for reversal or new
trial.
4.

U.R.C.P. 61.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF JURY TRIAL AND
JURY PREJUDICE ARE MERITLESS.
a.

Plaintiff's Claim of Right To Jury Trial On The
Issue Of Disability Is Meritless.

The above evidence shows clearly that Plaintiff did not
attempt to prove disability at trial, precluding a claim of error
on appeal.

Plaintiff merely argued impairment as an element of

general damages. Plaintiff failed to object or offer
instructions defining disability or even propose a special
verdict on the issue. Merely because Plaintiff failed to bring a
potential issue before the jury through her own waiver and
oversight does not merit reconsideration on appeal or a motion
for new trial.

Plaintiff's argument of failure to afford her a

jury trial on the issue of permanent disability must be rejected.
b.

Plaintiff's Claims Of Jury Prejudice Are
Spurious.

Plaintiff claims that the verdict was the result of
prejudice against the chiropractic profession by two jurors. The
-22-

argument disingenuously claims that two jurors disregarded the
evidence and found some of Dr. Whitley's bills unnecessary.
Plaintiff would pretend by this argument that she had no
opportunity to prevent the alleged prejudice.
Under U.R.C.P. 47, where a party knows or believes a juror
is biased before the jury is sworn, failure to challenge the
juror before the empanelment constitutes waiver.
249 P.2d 514 (Utah 1952).

Burton v. ZCMI,

In this case, the record clearly

demonstrates that Plaintiff's counsel, with full knowledge of the
now alleged prejudicial disposition of the two jurors, passed the
jurors for cause. TR. 44-46.

Further, Plaintiff's counsel did

not exercise preemptory challenges to excuse the two jurors now
alleged to have been prejudiced.

Id.

The lack of merit to the

argument is obvious. Plaintiff cannot be heard to complain of
prejudice in light of her counsel's own failure to act to remove
the allegedly biased jurors.
X.
CONCLUSION
Appellee has shown that Plaintiff has failed to sustain her
burden of proving a no-fault threshold has been met at trial.
Therefore, the court was correct in ruling that Plaintiff could
not recover general damages as a matter of law.
Plaintiff failed to prove threshold medical expenses and
failed to offer any proof of permanent disability.

Further,

Plaintiff waived all claims of error on the court's failure to
-23-

instruct the jury regarding permanent disability by its own
failure to offer instructions or special verdicts. Finally,
Plaintiff has waived claims of juror bias on appeal because
Plaintiff was fully aware of the alleged bias prior to smearing
the jury and she failed to challenge the jurors.
Plaintiff's appeal must be denied and the court's judgment
on the verdict, and denial of Plaintiff's motion for new trial
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1994.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

TERK?)MLTPEMJT
BRAnEEYlR. HELSTEN
Attorneys of Record for
Defendant Bone
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A-1

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by
L 1985, ch. 242, <> 27; 1986, ch. 204, *> 159;
1989, ch. 261, * 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991,
ch. 74, ^ 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "mamtaming, and administering" in the next-to-last

31A-22-309

sentence in Subsection (2Ha), added present
Subsection (2Md> and redesignated former Subsection (2Hd) as present Subsection (2Me) and
made, minor stylistic changes in Subsection
(D(a) and in the second sentence in Subsection
(2)(a)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Allowable benefits.
—Loss of earnings.
Allowable benefits.
—Loss of earnings.
A claimant who was unemployed at the time
of his or her accident can collect disability ben-

efits for lost wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a job
w a s available for which the claimant was qualif!ed and that the claimant would have taken
th
f >ob T h e >*•»>*«», d l d nf l n t e n d to P™"
vide compensation for loss of earning capaclty" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and
specific monetary loss Versluis v. Guaranty
Natl Cos., 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1992).

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained
one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of the insured and not insured
under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials.
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(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307
re reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty
in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
ncluding those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given
>y the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
nade on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
•vendue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasontble proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If
easonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported
>y reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is
•eceived by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is
ater supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days
ifter the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of VI2% per
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal iryury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31 A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, 3 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, $ 8;
1992, ch. 230, $ 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, made minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote

Subsection <2)(a)(i), which read: "for any injuries sustained by the injured while occupying
another motor vehicle owned by the insured
and not insured under the policy."
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the
beginning of Subsection (1).
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Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 46, F R C P

IhUlC

TT I

Cross-References. — Objections to lnstructions to jury, U.R.C.P 51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
objection to it, party waived any objection to
ANALYSIS
the verdict form Martmeau v. Anderson, 636
In general
P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981).
Form of verdict
Instructions.
—Duty to examine and object.
—Right
to object.
Instructions
The parties have a right to make objections
—Right to object
to the instructions to preserve challenges to
Harmless error.
their accuracy, if counsel was prevented from
Cited
making objections to instructions, he should,
In general.
To preserve a question for appeal, an objec- under this rule, be deemed to have done so.
tion must be clear and concise and made in a Hanks v. Chnstensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon. 564 (1960).
Harmless error.
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App.
If
the instructions are correct, any error
1989), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
which prevents counsel from making objections
Form of verdict.
thereto is harmless error. Hanks v.
Chnstensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564
—Duty to examine and object
Counsel has the obligation not only to object (1960).
Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively
seek to examine it, by failing to request court (Utah 1981); Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198
permission to examine the verdict and make (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error ^ 501, 5 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and Error
§& 545, 553, 558
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error & 202 et
seq
A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-

tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection
to evidence absent contemporary objection at
trial, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 619.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 169
et seq., 248.

Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall t^ke the same oath, and shall have the
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall
not be used against the alternates.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the

intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause.
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken
on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a
person competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party,
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to
such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then
a witness therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged,
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such
challenge.
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff,
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list,
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.
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(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be
tried with a new jury.
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them
on any subject connected with the trial.
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not,
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves
or any of them, but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of,
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in
writing or taken down by the reporter.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed.
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment
for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict When the jury or three-fourths of them, or
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or

i v u i e *±i

clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury
may be sent out again.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) and
(b) of this rule are similar to Rule 47, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Jurors generally,
§ 78-46-1 et seq.

Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.
Witness, juror as, § 78-24-3; U.R.E. 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional instructions.
—Absence of counsel.
Prejudice.
—Entry of judge into jury room.
Challenges for cause.
—Acquaintance with party.
—Bias or prejudice.
Malpractice.
Religious affiliation.
Waiver of right to challenge.
Wrongful death.
—Failure to remove juror when cause established.
Prejudicial error.
Correction of verdict.
—Award of damages.
Excess of maximum.
Travel expenses.
—Waiver of objection.
Insufficient on face.
Declaration of verdict.
—Impeachment.
—Intent of rule.
—Three-fourths concurrence.
Dissent.
Removal of municipal officer.
Deliberations.
—Impeachment of verdict.
—Knowledge of everyday affairs.
Examination.
—Judge's discretion.
—Preliminary questions.
Juror's misconduct.
No verdict.
—Directed verdict.
Papers taken by jurors.
—Depositions.
—Pleadings.
Introduction into evidence.
—X-rays.
Peremptory challenges.
—Number allowed.
Separation.
—Outside communication.
View of property or place.
—Eminent domain.
Cited.
Additional instructions.
—Absence of counsel*
Prejudice.
Where, upon request of the jury, the trial
court brought the jury back into the courtroom,
explained apparently conflicting instructions,

told the jury to reread all instructions, and offered future assistance if needed, unless appellant could show substantial or prejudicial
error, it was not error to have proceeded without appellant's counsel who had left the court
building. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah
1979).
—Entry of judge into jury room.
Where bailiff had informed trial judge that
jurors wanted advice on a certain point, it was
improper for judge to go into jury room to advise them in absence of and without consent of
counsel. Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268,
342 P.2d 884 (1959).
Challenges for cause.
—Acquaintance with party.
In action by truck owner whose vehicle was
damaged when it struck defendant's cow on
highway, plaintiffs challenge of jurors for
cause on grounds they were acquainted with
defendant and were engaged in raising livestock did not fall within grounds specified in
this rule, and failure to remove challenged jurors from panel was not an abuse of discretion.
C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v. Stewart, 29
Utah 2d 353, 509 P.2d 821 (1973).
—Bias or prejudice.
Malpractice.
In a medical malpractice action, prospective
juror's statement made on voir dire examination that she would give more weight to the
defendant doctor's testimony because of his
status as a doctor established bias and prejudice, which was not obviated by her statement
hat if the doctor's testimony was not in accord
rith the evidence she would accept the other
evidence, and she should have been removed
or cause; forcing party to use a peremptory
challenge to remove such prospective juror was
prejudicial error. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d
533 (Utah 1981).
Religious affiliation.
Whenever a religious organization is a party
to the litigation, voir dire regarding the jury
panel's religious affiliations is proper. Hornsby
v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d
929 (Utah C t App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1988).
Waiver of right to challenge.
Ordinarily, if a party knows or believes that
a juror or jury is disqualified because of bias or
prejudice, the challenge must be asserted be-

A

1

Propriety of substituting JUIOI in biiuicdied
state trial after end of first phase and before
second phase is given tojury, 89 A.L.R.4th 423.
Examination and challenge of federal case
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864.

ke> Numbers. — J my *-*66, 72, 112, 114 to
121, 125, 126, 131(1) to 133, 136, 148, 149;
Trial «=* 28, 303, 307, 312, 313,316, 321, 321V2,
324, 325, 339, 340

Rule 48, Juries of less than eight — Majority verdict.
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less
than eight or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall
be taken as the verdu t or finding of the jury.
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to
Rule 48, F.R.C.P.
Cross-Reference.%.
Numt>et of jurors,
§ 78-46-5

Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
i^rr * r o i An, ,
£ E r f o f t u S a ! ofilcer.
Effect of Rule 47(q).
Intent of U.R.C.P. 47(q) is to allow the parties the opportunity to ensure that the requisite number of jurors concurred in the verdict;
it is not a vehicle to bring into issue the court's

instruction as to the number of concurring jurors required to reach a verdict. Madesen v.
Brown, 701 P.2d 10«6 (Utah 1985,
Removal of municipal officer.
Removal of municipal officer does not lequire unanimous verdict by a jury; a threefourths majority is acceptable. Madesen v.
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d
47 Am Jur 2d Jury k 124
et seq.
C.J.S. — 50 ('J S Jufi«» \ 123, 89 CJ b
Trial § 494.
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept ver-

diet by number or proportion ofjurors less than
that constitutionally permitted, 15 A.L.R.4th
213.
Key Numbers. — Jury *» 32(2); Inal «=»
32' 0

Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories.
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of
the issue so omitted unless befone the jury retires he demands its submission
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsis-

tent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.
Compiler's Notes. - - This rule is similar to
Rule 49, F.R.C.P
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
Appeals.
Discretion of court.
Effect of inconsistent answers.
Entering judgment in accord
111swers.
Interest.
Objections to questions.
Proximate cause issue.
Role of jury.
—Special verdicts.
Special interrogatories.
Cited.
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
When special interrogatories or verdicts are
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to
object to the filing of the verdict or to move
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for
clarification; if a party fails to take appropriate
action before the discharge of the verdict, that
party generally may not later move for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was defective. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr Co ,
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985).
Appeals.
Where plaintiff did not object below, it cannot raise the failure to give special verdicts or
interrogatories on appeal without showing special circumstances warranting such a review.
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1987).
Discretion of court
The matter of entering judgment in accordance with the answers to special interrogatories is within the discretion of the trial judge.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960).
Use of a special verdict is left to the discretion of the trial court. Reiser v. Lofiner, 641
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), overruled on other
grounds, Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771
(Utah 1988).
It is within the broad discretion of the trial
court to determine if special interrogatories
are to be used and, if so used, the content
thereof. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v.
W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).
The use of special verdicts or interrogatories
is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P 2d
1239 (Utah 1987).
Effect of inconsistent answers.
A new trial does not have to be granted
merely because the answers to special verdict

questions are inconsistent. Milligan v. Capitol
Furn. Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P.2d 619 (1959).
Entering judgment in accordance with answers.
Where jury's general verdict in a condemnation case was in conflict with its answers to
special interrogatories as to the value of the
property before and after taking, the matter of
entering judgment in accordance with the answers was within discretion of the trial judge
and was properly exercised in the case. Weber
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11
Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960).
Interest.
Any litigant may demand the interest issue
in an action for payment of past due money be
submitted to the jury on special interrogatory
where that issue has not been reserved for resolution by the trial court; if he fails to so demand he waives his right to trial of that issue
by jury. Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah
1979).
Where defendant waived jury's determination of issue of interest on award by not voicing
his claim until after jury's dismissal, thereby
presenting the issue to trial court for final determination, trial court's determination that
jury had considered interest issue in its deliberation and that award in fact incorporated an
interest payment was not arbitrary or capricious and would not be altered on appeal. UteCal Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
Objections to questions.
Where defendant did not object to questions
submitted in special verdict, he cannot on appeal raise the issue that the questions were
confusing. Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308
P.2d 264 (1957).
Proximate cause issue.
Where the case is submitted under a general
verdict, proximate cause is for the jury.
Milligan v. Capitol Furn. Co., 8 Utah 2d 383f
335 P.2d 619 (19591
Role of jury.
—Special verdicts.
Special verdicts that plaintiff both suffered a
specified amount of damages and was guilty of
contributory negligence were not inconsistent
and thereby void, since in special verdict jury
finds facts and court applies law. Brigham v.
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470
P.2d 393 (1970).
Special interrogatories.
Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in

—Splitting of negligence and damages issues.
Judgment no v. in favor of patient in personal injury action against hospital on the
question of negligence and ordering of new
trial to determine amount of damages was improper since, in personal injury action, question of how accident happened, who was at
fault, and pain and injury occasioned thereby
are so intermingled that if trial is ordered, in

fairness to both parties, it should be on all issues. Hyland v. St. Mark's Hosp., 19 Utah 2d
134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967).
Cited in Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 476
(Utah 1981); Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 427
(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Gagon v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 106 to 151; 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 857 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 59 to 61;
88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 249 to 265.
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or
direction of verdict on opening statement of
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-

fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R.3d
1330.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 199; Trial «=»
167 to 181.

Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury,on
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of
the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case,
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule varies sub
stantially from Rule 51, F.R.C.P., after .which
it is patterned.
*

ross-References. — Exceptions unnecessary, U.R.C.P. 46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Comments on evidence.
—Allowed and disallowed.
—Proper.
Accurate statement of facts.
Copy of instructions.
—Delay.
Meaning.
—Entire context.
Necessity of objections.
—Failure to object.
Appellate review.
Burden of overcoming.

Court's failure to instruct.
Wniver.
—Opportunity to object.
Effect of denial.
—Purpose of rule.
—When made.
After jury retires.
Before jury retires.
During trial.
Oral instructions.
—Necessity.
—Preservation by court
si
Specific; instructions.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «= 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions*and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.

Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.

A-6

reaei irom judgment unaer nuie 01 i^ivn procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956.
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or
other parts of the records and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 794.
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing
relief from final judgment where its prospective application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed.
309.
Independent actions to obtain relief from
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558.

as rendering federal district court judgment
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R.
Fed. 831.
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 165.
Who has burden of proof in proceeding under
Rule 60(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to have default judgment set aside on
ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction,
102 A.L.R. Fed. 811.
Key Numbers. — Judgment ** 294 et seq.,
306, 307.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 61, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admission of evidence.
Amendment of pleadings.
Burden of showing error.
Exclusion of evidence.
Instructions.
Judgment presumed valid.
Judicial notice.
Liability for costs.
Notice of appeal.
Party creating or approving error.
Refusal to direct verdict.
Refusal to grant mistrial.
Service of summons.
Substantiality of error.
Trial error corrected in judgment.
Cited.
Admission of evidence.
No prejudice results from the fact that part
of the testimony as to a particular matter is '
hearsay where the witness also has personal
knowledge of that matter, and testifies accordingly. Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143,
239 P.2d 215 (1951).
Where the case was tried by the court without a jury, error in receiving testimony of a
party who was disqualified to testify by dead
man statute was insufficient to constitute any
ground for reversal since there was ample evidence without such testimony to support the
finding of the trial court. Thatcher v. Merriam,
121 Utah 191, 240 P.2d 266 (1952).
Facts that some evidence of insurance agents
inadvertently got into the record was not prejudicial under the circumstances of the case, especially since one of the defendants was a large
corporation, and there was no apparent reason

why a jury would find against an insurance
company and not against such a defendant.
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 764 (1952).
Where personal injury plaintiff had introduced evidence as to her sales ability and her
opportunity for success and loss of probable income of $1000 per month, it was not prejudicial
error for defendant to be allowed to show that
plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy and had
unpaid judgments against her. Bullock v.
Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975).
Affidavits regarding the jury's request for a
dictionary to define "proximate" in order to understand "proximate cause" were admissible
where a question existed as to whether or not
use of the dictionary was "prejudicial." Hillier
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
Amendment of pleadings.
Where the court did not find that the defendant maintained an attractive nuisance as had
been alleged in an amendment to the complaint, no prejudicial error was committed by
the court in permitting the plaintiff to file the
amendment and to offer evidence thereto, over
the objections of the defendant. Draper v. J.B.
& R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d
360 (1952).
Burden of showing error.
This rule places upon an appellant the burden of showing not only that an error occurred,
but that it was substantial and prejudicial in
that the appellant was deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury. Ashton v. Ashton, 733
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APR 2 9 1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SPECIAL VERDICT

KHAI CHANHMANY,

CASE NO. 910907726

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOYCE A. PRESTON and
BRIAN D. BONE,
Defendant.

Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of
the evidence•

If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of

the issue presented, answer "yes."

If you find the evidence is so

equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented# answer "no.11 Also, any damages assessed must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

At the time and place and under the circumstances of this

case, was the defendant, Joyce A. Preston, negligent?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No > C

If you have answered number 1 in the affirmative, was the

negligence of Joyce A. Preston a proximate cause of the damages
claimed by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

-2-

3.

At the time and place and under the circumstances of this

case, was the defendant, Brian Bone, negligent?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes X

No

If you have answered number 3 in the affirmative, was the

negligence of Brian Bone a proximate cause of the damages claimed
by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
5.

Yes A

No

If you have answered questions 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the

affirmative,

state

what

proportion

of

said

negligence

is

attributable to:
O

%

lOO

%

100

%

Joyce A, Preston
Brian Bone
TOTAL
6.

Please state the total damages, if any, which have been

incurred as a direct consequence of said negligence which would
reasonably compensate the plaintiff.
Past Medical Expenses

$_

a}:.(.

Past Wage Loss

$

)0I*

General Damages

,V -%|u i c \o&r ^/y

TOTAL DAMAGES

G

J^

$ 50/V), G Q
$ S^t

r I . A 0

Dated this "->' •• dav of April, 1993.

FOREPERSON

00343
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ffRJEff SatT&SJST COURT

Third Judicial District

TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Bone
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180)
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

JUL 2 9 1993

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and
through his natural mother and
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually,

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D.
BONE,

Civil No. 910907726PI
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
The

above-entitled

case

was

tried

before

a

jury

commencing April 27, 1993 and continuing through April 29, 1993 on
the complaint of the plaintiff, Khai Chanhmany, versus both Joyce
A. Preston and Brian D. Bone.

The claim of plaintiff Randy

Chanhmany was bifurcated from the case of Khai Chanhmany just prior
to the commencement of trial.

The jury, having heard evidence

produced by the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, the Court having received
the Special Verdict on the jury and also having considered the
issue as to whether or not Plaintiff had met the threshold
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(l) and having made

003

its Minute Entry on July 1, 1993, based upon the Special Verdict of
the jury and the Minute Entry of the Court,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The plaintiff Khai Chanhmany was not negligent.

2.

The defendant Joyce A. Preston was not negligent.

3.

The defendant Brian D. Bone was negligent, and his

negligence was the sole proximate cause of the damages claimed by
the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany.
4.

The total damages which have been incurred by Khai

Chanhmany as a direct consequence of the negligence of Brian D.
Bone are as follows:
a.

Past medical expenses

b.

Past wage loss
TOTAL

5.

$2,100.00
101.00
$2,201.00

Even though the jury in its Special Verdict found

general damages in favor of the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany in the sum
of $3,000.00, in accordance with the Minute Entry of the Court
dated July 1, 1993, the Court specifically finds that she is not
entitled to general damages in this matter because she failed to
meet the threshold requirements of § 31A-22-309(l) Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).

Due to the fact that Plaintiff

failed to prove that she had met the $3,000.00 threshold for
medical expenses as required by Utah Code Annotated S 31A-22309(1)(e) (1953, as amended) and further that Plaintiff failed to
prove that she had suffered a permanent disability in accordance
-2-

00393

with Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(1)(3).

The Court further

finds that the award made by the jury for general damages was
indicative that the jurors did not find Plaintiff suffering from
any permanent disability.

Further, the Court specifically finds

that the plaintiff failed to comply with any of the other potential
"threshold" criteria set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309
(1953, as amended).
6.

Plaintiff Khai Chanhmany is, therefore, entitled to

a judgment against the defendant Brian Bone only in the sum of
$2,201,00 plus interest in an amount of $402.30 and costs in the
amount of $219.00, for a total judgment of $2,822.30.
7.

Defendant Joyce A. Preston is entitled to judgment

against the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany on the plaintiff's complaint
of no cause of action and is entitled to her taxable court costs
from the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany.
8.

It was determined that all judgment entered herein

will draw interest following the entry of judgment in accordance
with Utah statute, Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-4 (1953, as amended).
DATED this r%^ day of July, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

^X/>J^

A - K^IL^JC

^IpNORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
] 3 i s t r i c t Court Judge

-3-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, postage prepaid, this
/ o a a y of July, 1993, to the following:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant Preston
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

TMPilrj/92-152.43
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